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1.

Introduction

This paper addresses the disputes brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the
European Communities and the United States concerning certain Indiin measures

affecting the importation of automobiles and components in the lbrm of "completely
knocked down" (CKD) and "semi-knocked down" (SKD) kits. The measures in question
originated during a time when India employed extensive import licensing requirements,
ostensibly for balance of payments purposes. India's broad licensing regime was
challenged in 1997 by the European Communities and the United States, resulting in a
settlement with the European Communities and a ruling in favor of the United States
pursuant to which India agreed to abolish its import licensing system. Some restrictions
in die automotive sector remained, however, which became the subject ol'this proceeding.
The automotive restrictions resulted from a law luown as Public Notice 60 (PN60),
enacted in 1997, which provided that companies desiring to obtain import licenses for
CKD or SKI) kits must enter a contract with the government known as a "Memorandum
of Understanding" (MOU). These MOUs, among other things, required companies to
achieve stated local content percentages ("indigenization requirements") in their
manufacturing operations, and to ensure that the value of their exports was equal to the
value of their imports ("trade balancing requirements"). The contractual commitments to
the government through the MOUs remained binding and enforceable even afler the
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import licensing regime that had given rise to them was abolished,

The European

Communities and the United States claimed that the indigenization requirements and the
trade balancing requirements constituted violations of Articles IlI and XI of GAIT 1994
and Article 2 of'TIMs.
The proceedings were consolidated before a single dispute panel, which rulcd in favor or
the European Communities and the United States with respect to both measures.' India
indicated that it wiould appeal. but later withdrew its appeal and thus the Appellate Body
did not address the substance of the dispute. 2 In a communication dated November 6,
2002, India informed the Dispute Settlement Body that it had issued new Public Notices
withdrawing the indigenization and trade balancing requirements contained in Public
Notice 60, and by implication suggesting that any such requirements in surviving MOUs
would be deprived of effect.
The dispute is an unremarkable one and of limited significance from a legal standpoint.
The indigenization requirements and trade balancing requirements are clear violations of
GA*IT 1994 and TRIMs in the absence of a valid defense, lndia's purported justification
fir them -- a balance of payments justification under Article XVIII of 'ATT 1994 -- had
been found insufficient in dte earlier proccoding regarding its import licensing system.
The case does touch on some broader legal issues of systemic importance: the role of res
judicata in WTO law, the question of what constitutes governmental action sufficient to
constitute a "requirement' or "measure," and the boundary betwccn border measures
covered by Article XI and domestic measures covered by Article I'l. But the case breaks
little new ground on any of these points.
From an economic perspective, the issues raised by the case are also quite
straightforward. Local content requirements such as the "indigenization" requirement,
and measures such as the trade balancing requirement, disadvantage imports and the
companics that use them. They can be understood as protectionist measures that benefit

'Report of the Panel in hidia-- Measures Affecting the Antomotive Sector, WT/DS 146/R,
\VT/DS I751R, adopted April 5, 2002 (hereafter Panel Rep.).
2

Report of the Appellate Body in hidia-- Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector,
\VT/DS 146/R, WT/DS 175/R, adopted April 5, 2002.
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the domestic producers of inputs. Such invasurcs may harm foreign manufacturers and
input suppliers, and it is thus appropriate that WTO law should condemn them.
We proceed in the conventional fashion, laying out the legal issues and arguments in
Section 2. Section 3 offers a critical analysis of the case from a law and economics
perspective.

2. Factual and Legal Issues
2.1 The 1-listory and Nature of the Measures at Issue
For many years. India applied import restrictions that it justified on balance of payments
grounds. The restrictions were administered through an import licensing system. In

1997, the European Communities requested consultations with respect to all import
restrictions maintained by India, including those on the products at issue in the
autointi\ e dibputc. India and the European Communities reached a settlement later that

year, a "mutually agreed solution" in WTO parlance, which called for all of the
restrictions to be eliminated by March 31, 2003.
Also in 1997. the [IS requested consultations with India regarding quantitative
restrictions applied by India for balance of payments reasuns on 2,714 agricultural and

industrial product lines. That dispute proceeded to a panel, which ruled that the
restrictions violated Article XIl) of' UNI'T 1994 and were not justified by Article
XVIII:13 of GATT 1994 (pertaining to balance of payments measures by developing
countries).3 *lie Appellate Body upheld these lindings. The United States and India
subsequently agreed that India would comply with the recommendations and rulings of
the DS13 no later than April 1, 2001. by which time India would eliminate the system of
non-automatic licenses for imports.

3Panel

Report on India - QuaniiativeRestrictions on Imports ofAgricultural,Textile and

Industrial Produicts., (hereinafter "hIdia - Quantitative Re.vtrictions"), WT/DS/90/R,

adopted September 22. 1999.
4

Report of the Appellate Body in Inia - Quamitative Restrictions, WTIDS0AB/tR,
adopted on 22 September 1999.
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In 2000, when the panel in the automotive dispute was requested by the United States and
he European Communities, India still applied discretionary import licensing to 715 tariff
line items including cars imported in the form of CKD and SKD kits. Pursuant to the
agreement reached in the earlier proceedings, however, India altogether abolished its
licensing scheme on April 1, 2001.
The end of the import licensing system did not end European and American concerns
about the automotive sector, however, because of PN60 and the MOUs that resulted from
it. PN60 required any passenger car manufacturer wishing to obtain a licensee to import
CKD oi SKI) kits to covenant, through an MOU, to:
"(i)
Establishment of actual production facilities for manufacture of cars, and
not for mere assembly.
(ii)
A minimum oflforeign equity of 1)J$50 million to he brought in by the
foreign partner within the first three years of the start of operations, if the firm is a
joint venture that involves majority foreign equity ownership.
(iii)
Indigenization (i.e. local content) ol'components up to a minimum level of'
50% in the third year or earlier from the date of first import consignment of
CKD/SKD kitslcmponcnts. and 70% in the fifth year or earlier.
(iv)
broad trade balancing of' foreign exchange over the entire period of the
MOU. in terms of balancing between the actual CIF value of imports of
CKD/SKD kits/componets and the FOB value of exports of cars and auto
components over that period..." 5

The third and fourth of these requirements became the subject of the automotive dispute.
Much of India's defense in the case rested on the proposition that the matter had already
been resolved through the challenges to India's broad import licensing regime, or that it
was otherwise mooted by the abolition ofthe licensing regime in 2001. But the Liuropean
Communities and the United States argued that even if the import licensing regime that
had been used to extract the commitments in the MOUs had ended, PN60 remained on
the books and the MOUs that had been negotiated under it remained binding on the
companies that had signed them.
2.2 The Panel Decision
2.2.1 Relevance of Prior Proceedings on hdia -- QiantitativeRestrictions
"Panel Rep. 12.5.
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Much of tile panel decision relates to ldia's claims that tile claims brought by the
European Communities and the United States had already been resolved or were moot.
The panel disagreed.
India argued first that the measures in question weic no longer in existence due to
developments subsequent to the initiation of ihe dispute. The panel responded by noting
that the indigeni/afion and trade balancing requirements, as embodied in the MOUs.
iumained in effect afler the licensing system was abolished.'
India also made a rather novel res judicala argument. Ordinarily, a party to litigation
invoking the concept of resjudicaladoes so to avoid relitigating an issue that it prevailed
on in a prior proceeding. Here, by contrast, India invoked res judicat vith respect to the
issues that it had lost in the Inoia -- Quantitative Restrictions dispute. India's theory was
that the United States and the European Communities could not seek a new ruling on the
legality of measures that a previous dispute had addressed. The panel seemed to accept
that in principle it was improper to relitigate the same issues, but concluded that the
measures at issue in the automotive sector had not been before the prior dispute panel.
The prior dispute had concerned the legality of the broad import licensing regime, but had
not considered the indigenization and trade balancing requirements in the MOUs.?
The panel gave a similar response to India's argument that the measures in question could
not he adjudicated because they were covered by the "mutually agreed solution" reached
with the European Communities aflter its prior complaint. That agreement contained a
promise by the European Communities to refrain from bringing further proceedings
relating to the challenged measures, in exchange lbr India's promise to remove them over
time. The panel accepted the proposition that Europe would be bound by its promise, but
found once again that it did not encompass the specific measures at issue in the

automotive sector.$

6Panel Rep, 7,28.
7

Paael Rep. §7.103.

8Panel Rep. 7. 32-34.
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2.2.2 Analysis of Challenged Measures under GATT 1994 and TRIMs
Regarding the order of analysis, the panel saw little difference in the "specificity" of
GATT 1994 and TRIMs with respect to the challenged measures. Accordingly, it decided

to address the claims in the order that they were argued by the parties.
2.2.2.1 The Indigcnization Requirement
As noted, the indigenization requirement committed the companies signing MOUs to
procure 50-70 percent of their automobile parts and components from local sources, and
was a classic local content requirement in WTO parlancc. Both the European
Communities and the United States claimed that the indigenization requirement was
inconsistent with GATI' Article 111(4), which provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory or
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering lbr sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.
To evaluate the indigenization measure against this standard, the panel believed that four
issues must be addressed: "whether (1) imported products and domestic products are like
products; (2) the measures constitute a "law, regulation or requirement"; (3) they affect
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use; and (4)
imported products are accorded less favourablo treatment than the treatment accorded to
9
like domestic products."
Regarding the first issue, the dispute involved imported and domestic parts and
components of automobiles, distinguished only by their origin. The panel saw no basis
Ibr treating imported and domestic products as other than "like," and India did not dispute
the point."'

9Panel

Rep. 7.172.

1"Panel Rep. 7.174.
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Regarding the second issue, both the European Communities and the United States
argued that the indigenization requirement in PN60 and embodied in the MOUs was a
"requirement" under Article 111(4). Companies were not compelled to subject themselves
to it, but they had to do so if they wished to obtain a government benefit (an import
license). Citing UATr precedent, the panel accepted the proposition that the tern
"requirement" includes "those which an enterprise voluntarily accepts in order to obtain
I
an advantagc from the governmcnt." I
But India argued that once the import licensing regime was abolished, any "requirement'
ceased to exist -- no longer would any company have to agree to the indigenization
requirement to obtain an import license. The panel gave a tworold response, First, its
terms of reference required it to assess the legality of the measures in place at die time the
panel was constituted, and on that date the licensing regime was still in place. Second,
even afler the licensing regime was abolished, the MOUs remained enforceable as private
contracts with the govcunent and could be expected to affect commercial behavior
regardless of the government's enlbrccnient policy.12
India's final argument was that even if the MOUs remained enforceable, private contracts
with the government were analogous to "discretionary" legislation. It pointed to the
distinction under the old GATT system between mandatory legislation, which left
administering officials with no discretion to avoid violations if certain circumstances
arose, and discretionary legislation, which might result in a violation but always be
administered in a way that avoided violations. Only the former type of legislation could
be challenged "on its face" in the (A'il' system; the latter could be challenged only if was
applicd in a mamer that resulted in a violation. To this line of argument, the panel
suggested that binding contractual obligations might be expected to affect companies'
behavior, even if the govenunent did not actively enforce them.13 Further, ludia had
apparently conceded that it had not released companies rt their MOUs and had no
4
plans to do so in the future.1
"1Panel Rep. 117.183.
"Panel Rep.

7.190-93.

' 3Pancl Rep. 1118.42-44.

"Panel Rep. 8.46.

HeinOnline -- THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002 7 January 20, 2004

The third and fourth issues issue under Article 111(4) were casily resolved. rhe
indigenization requirement "affected" internal sale, and accorded imported products less
favorable treatment, because it modified conditions of competition between imported and
domestic like products and encouraged companies to buy domestic over imported
Is
products.
Ilie United States also argued that the indigenization requirement was inconsistent with
Article XI(I), and both complainants challenged the requirement under TRIMs. Having
rled that it was inconsistent with Article 111(4), however, the panel declined to examine
its consistency with Article XI or with TRIMs.
2.2.2.2 The Trade Balancing Requirement
Both the European Communities and the United States argued that aspects of the trade
balancing requirement were inconsistent with Articles Ill and XI of GATT 1994, although
their positions differed in certain details, The panel saw greater coimnon ground in their
discussion of Article X1, and decided to address issues under Article XI first.
Article XI(I) provides:
No prohibition or restriction other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale
for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
The trade balancing requirement was not in itself a "quota, import or export license," and
so the initial question was whether it is among the "other measures' covered by Article
XI(I). The panel had little difficulty concluding that it is. It reasoned that the balancing
requirements, embedded in the MOUs, resulted directly from the legislative enactment
PN60 and thus represent "measures" by the Indian government.
The next question was whether the "measure" amounted to a "restriction...on the
importation" of goods. India contended that the measure did not relate directly to the
"5 Panel Rcp. 17.196-202.
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entry of goods into Indian customs territory, and thus was not a "rcstriction on
importation." 'Ihe panel disagreed, relying on the plain meaning of "restriction," It
simply noted that the balancing requirement prohibited imports in excess of stipulated
amounts determined by each company's exports. It was further "comforted" by the
Iblowing lauguage to he found in the Illustrative List olrTRIMs:
1 RIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of general obligation of
elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in puragraph I of Article XI of
GATrF 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic
law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is nccessary to
obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local
production, generally or to an amount related to the volume or value of local
production that it exports. th
The trade balancing requirement thus came within Article XI(I), and violates GATT 1994
in the absence of an effective defense. India claimed a balance of payments delense as in
the earlier proceeding, but presented no evidence on the matter. The panel ruled,
following prior decisions, that India had the burden of proof when asserting an
affirmative defense under Article XVIII:B, and that its failure to come forward with
evidence meant that its defense necessarily lNiled.
I laving fbund an inconsistency with Article XI, the panel again appealed to judicial
economy to avoid a full discussion of the trade balancing measure in relation to Article Ill
and TRIMs.
file panel did address one specific feature of the trade balancing
requirement in relation to Article 1I1(4). It noted that any company subject to an MOU
buying a previously imported CKD or SKD kit in the Indial domestic market would have
that purchase counted as an "import" lbr purposes of the trade balancing requirement.
Thus, previously imported kits were disadvantaged on domestic resale relative to
domestically produced like products. "lhepanel was of the view that, whatever the proper
boundary between the mcasurcs covered by Article Ill and XI in general, a measure
disadvantaging imported goods on domestic resale was a potential violation of Article
111(4). Proceeding through the four issues laid out above in the discussion of' the
indigenization requirement in relation to Article 111(4), the panel again found that the

16l1anel Rep. , 7.279.
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trade balancing requirement incorporated a "requirement affecting internal sale" that
all'rded less Ilivorable treatment to imported like products."
2.3 The Appellate Body Decision
As noted in the introduction, India ultimately withdrew its notice o" appeal an rescinded
PN60 without further proceedings. Accordingly, the Appellatc Body did not consider the
substantive issues in the case.
3. Critical Analysis
3.1 Legal Commentary
The automotive dispute was largely a "mopping tip" operation aimed at eliminating sonic
remaining vestiges of the import licensing regime that had been found to violate WTO
law in India -- QuantitativeRestrictions. During that regime, the indigenization and trade
balancing requirements in the automotive sector had been made effective tuough
contracts (MOUs) with the government that companies executed to obtain import
licenses. The contracts remained in force even after the licensing scheme was abolished,
and the government gave no indication of an intention to release companies from them
(indeed, it indicated to the contrary before the dispute panel).
The indigenization requirement was a classic "local content" requirement, a paradigm
example of the sort of measure that was the target o" the TRIMs agreement and that had
been held to violate Article 111(4) of GATT 1994 in the past." The trade balancing
requirement, in so far as it limited the value of goods imported by a company to the value
of its exports, was likewise a clear target of TRIMs and was well understood to violate
Article XI of GATT 1994.19 Finally, the aspect of the trade balancing requirement that
limited the capacity of companies to purchase products imported by others, and thus
affected their domestic resale, was also a target of TRIMs and a clear violation of GATT

1"Panel

Rep. 17.295-309.

lSee TRIMS Annex, Illustrative List 1(a).
'See TRIMS Annex, Illustrative List 12(a).
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Article II1(4).20 India's balance of payments defense ibr such measures had been rejected
previously, and India's reassertion l'that defense in this case was at best hall'hearted.

The case touches on a few broader issues, but in the end does not say much about them.
India's peculiar invocation of r.s juedicala as to issues that it had lust in India -Quantitative Restrictions raises a general question about the place of doctrines like res
judicata and collateral estoppel in the WTO system. The panel seemed willing to accept
that it was inappropriate to relitigate identical issues bctween the same parties that had
been resolved in prior disputes, but avoided any definitive statement on the matter simply
by noting that the issues raised by PN60 and the MOUs were new and had not been
previously considered. The hint in the case that specific issues may not be relitigated
stands in contrast to the commonly understood proposition that stare decisis does not
apply in WTO law (even though as a practical matter earlier precedents receive
considerable respect).
The differences in the positions of the United States and Europe as to the applicability of
and XI to the various measures highlights another issue that has
AT Articles IlI
perplexed WTO/GATT scholars through the years, namely, the precise boundary between
the measures covered by Article Ill and the measures covered by Article XI. 1he same
issue confronted an old GATT panel faced widi a challenge to the Canadian Foreign
hIvestment Review Act, which stated in the course of its opinion:

The Panel shares the view of Canada that the General Agreement distinguishes
between measures aflliting the 'importation' of products, which arc regulated in
Article Xi:l, and those affecting 'imported products', which are dealt with in
Article Ill. If Article XlI: were interpreted broadly to cover also internal
requirements, Article Ill would be partly superlluous.3The potentially elusive distinction between measures allcting "importation" and those
affecting "imported products" is to a considerable degree unimportant. Complaining
nations will usually care little whether a measure is found illegal under Article liI or
Article Xi as long as it is fbund illegal under one of them, and there is no obstacle under
2u'See

TRIMS Annex, Illustrative List I(b).

2 1GAIT

Panel Report, L15504, adopted on 7 February 1987, 5.14.
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WTO law to alternative pleading. But whatever its importance, the panel's treatment of
the issues here sheds no new light on the distinction. The panel does not broach the
general question ol' how to draw the line, but instead maneuvers its order of analysis to
follow the classification scheme in the TRIMs Annex: 22 Based on the illustrative list in
the Annex, the indigcnization requirement and the part olthe trade balancing requirement
that applies to previously imported goods are measures affecting "imported products"
subject to Article Ill. But the trade balancing requirement affects "importation" when it
restricts what a company may import directly. It will he recalled that the panel analyzed
the indigenization requirement under Article III and invoked judicial economy to avoid
considering it under Article Xl. It did the opposite with the trade balancing requirement,
save for the part of it that applied to previously imported goods which was analyzed
under Article Ill. The panel thus applied the pertinent GATT articles is TRIMs suggests
they should be without actually ruling on the dividing line between them.
One of the more interesting issues in the case relates to the distinction in old GATT
jurisprudence between "mandatory" and "discretionary" legislation. The continued
vitality of that distinction in WTO law remains an open question, to be sure, and one
unappealed WTO panel decision concerning Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974
questions its utility.23. Nonetheless, WTO members continue to raise the distinction in
various contexts, and it surfaced in an interesting way in the automotive dispute. India
argued that the measures contained in the MOUs were in the nature of contractual
provisions that the govermnent could elect not to enforce. As such, they were analogous
to "discretionary legislation" -- legislation that might be administered in such a way as to
violate WTO law, but that affords sufficient discretion to administrators to avoid any
violations. Under GATT jurisprudence, such legislation could not be challenged "on its
face," but only if it resulted in a violation as applied. Thus, India reasoned, the measures
embodied in the MOUs could be challenged only if India took some steps to enforce
them.
As noted, the panel rejected this line or reasoning by noting that India had not stated an
intention to release companies from their MOUs, and that a mere possibility of
22

See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.

'3See Panel Report in United States -- Sections 301 - 310 or'the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS 152/R, adopted January 27,2000, 7.51-53.
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enlbrcement action might encourage companies to follow their MOU commitments.
Both observations are no doubt correct, but they may prove too much. It is perhaps often
the case that legislation deemed "discretionary" under the old (GATT system has some
chilling efl:ct at odds with GATT obligations because of the possibility of enforcement in
a way that violatcs GAT. Only when a government unequivocally and credibly commits
itself to administer the legislation in a way that complies with GATT might any such
"chilling elffct" be avoided. Thus. the analogy bctwNecn the MOUs and discretionary
legislatiun is stronger than the panel allowed. Its ,Lsolution of the matter perhaps hints at
a new principle that also resonates with the panel decision in Unifed ,'talas -- Section 301:
It is not enough that a measure affords administrative "discretion" to avoid violations of
WTO law. To avoid challenges to such a measure on its face, a country must also
provide credible assurances that administrative discretion will in fact be exercised in a
way that averts any violations.

3.2 Economic Commentary
Ve turn now to consider the economic aspects of local content requirements. A common
Ibrm of a local content requirement specifies that a certain physical proportion of
domestic inputs be embodied in the final good. We fbcus here on the economic
implications of such local content requirements under different market structures,
A local content requirement is a protectionist instrument that is logically distinct from
both import tarilfl and import quotas. Unlike tariffs and quota licenses, a local content
requircmcnt does not generate government revenue. Such a requirement does. however,
create a wedge between the prices of domestic and foreign inputs. When an effective
local content requirement is in place, a lhreign final good producer with a domestic plant
is induced to increase the demand for domestic inputs, theteby raising the price of the
domestic input relative to that of the foreign input. The domestic government then
balances the consequent benefit to domestic input suppliers against the associated cost to
domestic consumers, where the latter cost is experienced if the higher domestic input
price leads to a higher domestic price for the final good.
'tie local content requirement also generates an international externality, if it reduces the
profits of' the Ibreign final good manulhcturers and/or foreign input suppliers. When
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setting its prel~rred unilateral policy, the domestic government does not internalize such
an effct. Thus, when a local content rule changes prices in such a way as to create an
international externality, a role may arise for al international trade agreement that
imposes restrictions upon local content requirements.
Using three models, we explore here the domestic effects of a local content requirement
and also the circumstances under which such a requirement generates an international
externality. The models share a common foundation, In each case, a final good (autos) is
produced, where each unit of the final good requires one unit of the input (kits). The final
good manufacturers are foreign (US), The input is supplied by a competitive market in
the foreign country (US) and also by a competitive market in the domestic country
(India). 'Fhe domestic and foreign inputs arc perfect substitutes, and the final good
requires no other input. The models differ in terms of the market power that the foreign
final good manuflacturers and the domestic govertuncnt ure assumed to possess.
Model 1: (onmpctitive 1nal Good Aarkel, omidl Dlniestic Country
We consider first a setting in which the final good is produced by a competitive industry
comprised (fbr simplicity) of' Ibreign firns. Final good manuflacturers then earn zero
profit, and so the domestic governnent is unable to use a local content requirement as a
means to extract profit from fbreign manufhcturers. Furthermore, we assume that the
domestic country is small, in the sense that the reduction in demand for foreign inputs
caused by the local content requirement does not depress the (world) price of foreign
inputs. This means that the profits of lbreign input suppliers are also unaffected by the
local content requirement. Our first setting is thus a benchmark case in which no
4
international externality arises.2
To examine the domestic consequences ofa local content requirement, we introduce the
following notation. Let Q and P denote the output and price of the final good in the
domestic market, respectively. This output is produced by a competitive final good
market according to the technology Q = X + X*, where X is the quantity of input
purchased from domestic suppliers and X* is the quantity of input purchased from foreign
suppliers. The local content requirement specifies that a lraction k ofinputs be purchased

24 For further discussion of related models, see Corden (1971), Grossman (1981) and
Vousden (1990, Chapter 2).
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from domestic suppliers; thus, when this requirement is (exactly) met, X = k(X + X*)

kQ. Let r and r*denote the respective prices of the domestic and foreign inputs. In tile
present model, r* is lixed and independent of any local content requirement, but the local
content requirement may affect r and thus the average price of the input, ra = kr + (1-k)r*.
Since the final good industry is competitive and uses only a single input, the price of the
final good is equal to the average price ofl'the input: P - ra.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the domestic supply of the input is described by an upwardsloping supply function, X(r), while the supply of the fbreign input is perfectly elastic at
the price r*. We ass'ime that the domestic supply function initially lies below the foreign
supply function (i.e., the fiust unit of domestic supply is offered at a price below r*) and
then crosses the foreign supply curve at some quantity Xf. The demand lbr the final good
is represented by the downward-sloping demand function, 1)(P). 1Jnder free trade, all
inputs trade at the price r* and the total quantity of inputs that is demanded (and thus the
quantity of'he final good that is produced) is given by Qf" D(r*). Accordingly, Xf units
of the domestic input are employed, and Xf = Qf - Xf units of the Ihreign input are
employed. Let kf- Xt/Qr'denote the fraction of the domestic input used under free trade.
Consider now the imposition of a local content requirement under which k > kf. Such a
policy must elicit a greater supply of the domestic input and so requires an increase in the
domestic input price. r. The equilibrium outcome is illustrated by point E. At this point,
the price of the domestic input is rc > r*and the quantity of the domestic input used is Xc
> Xr; Thus, the domestic input is now used at a higher volume and commands a higher
price. The local content requirement also induces an increase in the average input price,
with ra - krc + (I -k)r* > r*. 'I
his means that the total quantity of input that is demanded
(and thus the quantity of the final good that is produced) is reduced by the local content
requirement: Qc - D(ra) < D(r*) = Qf.
What are the domestic welfare consequences of the local content requirement? To
answer this question, it is easiest to imagine that the first Xc units ol final good output are
sold at the price rc while the next Qc - Xc units are sold at the price r. (The average
price is thea ra.) We begin with the first Xc units. The area r'rcEL represents consumer
surplus that is enjoyed under free trade and lost under the local content requirement.
Some of*this surplus is transferred to domestic input suppliers, who now enjoy additional
producer surplus corresponding to the area r'rcEK. The remaining area of lost consumer
surplus, KLE, is deadweight loss that is attributable to a production inefficiency that
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occurs when

llicient foreign supply of inputs is displaced by domestic input supply.

Now consider the next Qc - Xc units that arc sold at the price r*. For these units, the
local content requirement has no effect on the final good price or wellre. Finally, we

note that the local content requirement results in a reduction in the total output of the final
good (from Qf to Qc). The corresponding area, RTG, represents a second source of
deadweight loss associated with the local content requirement.
In total, then, the local content requirement reduces domestic national income, due to the
creation of deadweight loss as captured by the areas KLE and RTG. O course, if the
domestic government has political objectives such that it values the benefits to input
suppliers (i.e., the area r4 rCEK ) more heavily than the costs to consumers (i.e. the areas
r'reEL and RGT), then a local content requirement may be attractive.
In this model, all of the costs and benelits of the local content requirement reside within
the domestic economy. Since the foreign final good manufacturers cant zen) profit and
the price at which foreign inputs sell on world markets is fixed, the local content
requirement has no international externality. When the assumptions of this model hold,
no obvious role for the WTO arises, since the local content requirement is a domestic
policy that does not affect the welfare of any other member government.

Model 2: Monopoly Final Good Markct, Small Domestic Country
Maintaining the assumption that the domestic country is small, we now posit that the final
good is produced by a foreign monopoly. The wrinkle here is that the foreign final good
industry generates profit. and so a local content requirement may be entertained as a
means through which to extract profit from the foreign final good monopoly and shift it to
the domestic input suppliers.25 An international externality is thus suggested.
As above, we consider a local content requirement that requires the monopolist to use a
greater fraction of domestic input than it would under free trade. An important issue
concerns the manner in which the monopolist adjusts its output in response to this
25

Brander and Spencer (198 1) explore a related model, in which tariffs may be used to
extract profit from a fIreign monopolist.
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requirement.

To illustrate the issues involved, %ve first imagine that the foreign
monopolist does not change its output following the imposition of the local content
policy. The local content requirement then amounts to a transfer from the final good
monopolist to the doniestic input supply industry, since the monopolist must offer a
higher domestic input price in order to elicit the increased domestic input supply. This
strategic policy is attractive to the domestic government, even when the government has
no political objective and simply maximizes national income, hut the policy lo-wers world
velfare, since it creates a productive inetliciency: on the margin, foreign input suppliers
are replaced by less efficient domestic input suppliers.
These effects are illustrated in Figure 2. Under free trade, the foreign monopolist sets the
price P and produces the output Qr. and X, units of the inputs arc domestically supplied.
The profit earned by the foreign monopolist is given by the area r*PST. When tile local
content requirement is imposed, a greater proportion of the (fixed) output must embody
the domestic input. Thus, the domestic input price rises to r, > r*, and the use of the
domestic input rises to X, > Xr The area rrEiK then represents profit that is extracted
from the monopolist and shifted to the domestic input supply industry. The triangle KEL
is lost profit that becomes deadweight loss. ius, iflhe output of the lbreign monopoly is
held fixed, a local content policy is attractive to the domestic government as a means of
shifting foreign monopoly profit to the domestic input supply industry. Such a policy
imposes a negative international externality on the foreign monopolist (and thus the
foreign government) and results in a loss in world velfhre.
But of course the foreign monopolist is unlikely to keep its final good output constant. At
the free-trade quantity, the local content policy induces a higher input price on all traits of'
the domestic input without changing the input price of any units of the foreign input. The
local content policy thus raises the costs of production, and as a consequence the foreign
monopolist will respond by lowiering its output. 26 In turn, this means that a local content
requiremcnt induces a loss in consumer surplus for the domestic country. Accordingly,
the domestic government must balance the benefit of profit shifting (from the foreign

2 This raises the possibility that the local content rule might result in less overall use (f
the domestic input. While this possibility cannot be dismissed, plausible conditions can
be identified under which a small local content requirement (i.e., a policy that requires
that a slightly larger fraction of the domestic input be used than would be used under free
trade) results in an overall increase in the use of the domestic input, and we will proceed
on that assumption. For a general analysis and further discussion, see Grossman (198 1).
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monopolist to the domestic input industry) against the cost of a decline in consumer

surplus in the final good market. As a general matter, it is unclear whether a nationalincome maximizing government would seek to impose a local content policy. It is clear,
though, that such a policy is attractive to the domestic government, if this government has
political obI~ectivcs such that it values sufficiently the profit of input suppliers relative to
the surplus of final gtd cousumers.
In this second model, not all of the costs and benefits of the local content requirement
reside within the domestic country. lrlhe domestic government chooses to impose a local
content requirement (for whatever reason), then the welfrare o" the lbreign government is
reduced, since its monopolist suffers a reduction in profit. Thus, when market power in
the final good industry exists, a local content policy is associated with an international
externality, and a rationale for WTO rules that prohibit local content policies is provided.
Model 3: Monopoly Final(ond Markei Large Domestic Countr,
In the previous model, we introduce market power with the assumption that the final
good is produced by a foreign monopoly. Our next step is to add market r.wer over the
input market as well, with the assumption that the domestic country is large, in the sense
that a reduction in the demand of the foreign input by the foreign monopolist when
serving the domestic market results in a decline in the (world) price of the foreign input.
In this third model, a local content requirement may extract profit from the foreign
monopolist and affect as well the profit of foreign input suppliers.
1he novel assumption here is that the foreign monopolist faces lbreign and domestic
input supply functions that are upward-sloping,

We assume further the input supply

flunctions are symmetric. Under fre trade, an efficient foreign monopolist then uses the
same volume of domestic aid foreign inputs, and the input prices are thus equated in the
two markets. To assess the impact of a local content requirement, we again first imagine
that the forciga monopolist does not change its output in response to the local content
policy. As before, at a given quantity of output, an eftective local content requirement
forces the monopolist to use more of tile domestic input, and the supply of this input is
forthcoming only when the domestic input price rises. Tl7he local content rule again
extracts profit from the foreign monuopulist and shills it to the domestic input industry.
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We next consider the possibility that the foreign monopolist adjusts its quantity of output
following the imposition of the local content requirement, At the free-trade quantity, the

local content policy induces a higher input price on all units of the domestic input but
now also results in a reduction in the foreign input price on all units of the foreign input.
Ihe latter effect arises only in the third model, and reflects the fact that the monopolist's
reduced demand for lbreign inputs causes a decline in the price of the foreign input.
Now, if the local content policy is small (i.e., if it calls for only a slight increase in the use
ol"the domestic input, when the monopolist produces the fIree-trade output level), then the
policy has essentially no effect on the monopolist's costs: as before, the monopolist pays
a slightly higher input price on all units of the domestic input, hut now it also pays a
slightly lower input price on all units of the lreign input; furthermore, under our
symmetry assumption, it uses approximately the same amount of domestic and foreign
inputs, when the local content policy is small. This means that the monopoly output is
essentially unchanged after the imposition ol'a small local content policy. Such a policy
thus generates a profit-shilting advantage for the domestic country without causing a loss
in consumer surplus. Hence, a small local content policy is sure to be attractive to the
domestic govennent, even if the domestic government maximizes national income.
The case for WTO restrictions against local content requirements is now quite clear, The
domestic government has an unambiguous incentive to impose a small local content
policy, but such a policy is unambiguously bad fior the foreign monopolist and thus the
foreign government, and indeed lowers global welfare overall. In other words, the
rationale tor WTO involvement with respect to local content policies is now the same as
the rationale for WTl'O involvement with respect to tariffs by large countries. In each
case, a small amount of the policy is unambiguously beneficial to the party that uses the
policy, and unambiguously harmful to the trading partner and world welfare, with all of
these implications holding even when benefits arc measured in national-income terms.
Sulimar'
Our analysis here reveals that local content requirements may be attractive as a unilateral
policy in some circumstances. When markets are competitive and the domestic country is
small, such policies may cause a redistribution of surplus from domestic consumers to the
domestic input supply industry, with no associated international externality. The situation
changes, however. when market power is present. If a foreign monopolist supplies the
final good, then a local content policy may extract profit from the foreign monopolist and
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redistribute this surplus to the domestic input supply industry. Such a policy is more
attractive to the domestic government if the foreign monopolist does not respond with a
significant reduction in output. This is in turn more likely when the domestic country is
large, in the sense that the associated reduction in demand for the foreign input results in
a decline in the price or the foreign input. Accordingly, we conclude the local content
policies may be attractive to the domestic govcrnnient and harmful to the trading partner
when market power is present. WTO rules that restrict the application of local content
policies then rest on a firm economic lbundation.
While the models developed above abstract from a number of features that characterize
the market for automobile manufacturing in India, we believe that they nevertheless
provide useful lessons. In particular, we speculate that U.S. and European automobile
manufacturers in India possess some market power. Our analysis thus suggests that local
content requirements may he designed to shill the associated prolit ir'om foreign
automobile manufacturers to domestic input suppliers. Consequently, our analysis
provides support for WTO prohibitions against such requirements as they arise within the
automotive sector in India.
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